Several different quantum gravity research programmes suggest, for various reasons, that spacetime is not part of the fundamental ontology of physics. This gives rise to the problem of empirical coherence: if fundamental physical entities do not occupy spacetime or instantiate spatiotemporal properties, how can fundamental theories concerning those entities be justified by observation of spatiotemporally located things like meters, pointers and dials? I frame the problem of empirical coherence in terms of entailment: how could a non-spatiotemporal fundamental theory entail spatiotemporal (...) evidence propositions? Solutions to this puzzle can be classified as realist or antirealist, depending on whether or not they posit a non-fundamental spacetime structure grounded in or caused by the fundamental structure. These approaches place different constraints on our everyday concepts of space and time. Applying lessons from the philosophy of mind, I argue that only realism is both conceptually plausible and suitable for addressing the problem at hand. I suggest a role functionalist version of realism, which is consistent with both grounding and causation, and according to which our everyday concepts reveal something of the true nature of emergent spacetime. (shrink)

In 2001, I experienced severe radial neuropathy, leading to permanent dysfunctions in the fingers of my left hand. In this personal account of nerve damage, medical and surgical treatment, and adaptation, I first describe the sequence of neuropathies, then turn to how through serendipity, the brace enabled other connections—nervelines—with individuals and places. The brace is a metonym of a severed nerve with its associated loss of movement and capacity; it is also both a functional orthotic and an affordance. It carries (...) me forward, activating other nervelines and networks to make things happen. I write of literal and metaphoric nerves, evolving connectivities, and fiber lines, thought lines and collaborations. I then extend the idea of nervelines and networks to global connnections; I emphasize how the organization of labor, the distribution of goods and services, and the expectations of workers shape body histories and life outcomes. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyze pregnancy loss from a feminist phenomenological perspective. I draw upon relational accounts of personhood wherein a person's status and identity are formed through a lived history and the activity of “calling into personhood” a being a woman may seek to know or become. I draw upon the work of Simone de Beauvoir, who advances a feminist phenomenology that grounds the status and identity of women within embodied situations. Her important work sheds light on the varied (...) perceptions and processes that inform experiences of pregnancy and pregnancy loss. (shrink)

The dualism of nature/culture widely present within Western society at large is out of step with an increasingly urbanising world. Building on previous discussions of nature/culture duality, an integrative framework is presented that argues for the embracing of the ‘mundane nature’ found within human landscapes. As over half of the human population interacts with nature primarily within urban landscapes, increasing our awareness of such spaces is critical to understanding our ecological consciousness. The examples of a recent rooftop greening bylaw in (...) the city of Toronto and the social impacts of urban gardening are examined in this context. (shrink)

Hylomorphists hold that substances are, in some sense, composites of matter and form. The form of a substance is typically taken to play a fundamental role in determining the unity or identity of the whole. Staunch hylomorphists think that this role is of a kind that precludes the ontological reduction of form to the physical and thus take their position to be inconsistent with physicalism. Forms, according to staunch hylomorphism, play a fundamental role in grounding their bearers’ proper parts and (...) that, it seems, rules out the physical grounding of form itself. I shall develop a physicalist version of hylomorphism that treats form as geometric structure and which, I shall argue, entails many of the central theses endorsed by staunch hylomorphists. Based on Shoemaker’s notion of conditional powers, I shall argue that the geometric structures of complex wholes are the conditions on at least some of the conditional powers of their bearers’ proper parts, transforming those powers into powers simpliciter. Thus, forms play a fundamental role in the dynamical evolution of the physical world, but without bestowing causal powers themselves and hence without violating the causal closure of the physical domain. If a substance’s proper parts are taken to be individuated by their powers simpliciter, then they derive their identities from their places in the substantial whole, which thus determines the identities of its proper parts without changing their intrinsic natures. (shrink)

In the pure powers ontology (PPO), basic physical properties have wholly dispositional essences. PPO has clear advantages over categoricalist ontologies, which suffer from familiar epistemological and metaphysical problems. However, opponents argue that because it contains no qualitative properties, PPO lacks the resources to individuate powers, and generates a regress. The challenge for those who take such arguments seriously is to introduce qualitative properties without reintroducing the problems that PPO was meant to solve. In this paper, I distinguish the core claim (...) of PPO: (i) basic physical properties have dispositional essences, from a hitherto unnoticed assumption: (ii) the dispositional essences of basic physical properties exclusively involve type-causal relations to other basic physical properties. I reject (ii), making room for a structuralist ontology in which all basic physical properties are pure powers, individuated by their places in a causal structure that includes not only other powers, but also physically realized qualitative properties such as shapes, patterns and structures. Such qualities individuate pure powers in the way that non-mental input and output properties individuate realized mental properties in functionalist theories of mind, except that here it is basic physical powers that are individuated by relations to realized non-powers. I distinguish one Platonic and two Aristotelian version of this theory, and argue that the Aristotelian versions require that grounding is not always a relative fundamentality relation, because the powers ground the qualities that individuate them. By considering ontic structural realism, I argue that symmetric grounding is the best way to make sense of relational individuation in structuralist ontologies, and is therefore no additional commitment of the one proposed here. (shrink)

The causal closure of the physical poses a familiar causal exclusion problem for the special sciences that stems from the idea that if closure is true, then fundamental physical properties do all the causal work involved in bringing about physical effects. In this paper I aim to show that the strongest causal closure principle that is not ruled out by some simple physics in fact allows for a certain kind of downward causation, which in turn makes room for robust special (...) science autonomy. I focus on the case of vector composition, arguing that it involves irreducibly multilevel causation. To give a complete causal explanation of what goes on in cases that involve the effects of multiple forces, we need to appeal not only to the fundamental properties that generate those forces, but also to geometric properties that determine how multiple vectors compose. However, if all the causal work involved in such cases were due to fundamental physical properties, there would be a one-level explanation available. Hence, I argue, it cannot be the case that fundamental physical properties do all the causal work. The extra causal work, I suggest, comes from the fact that the causal powers bestowed by fundamental physical properties have irreducibly geometric manifestation conditions. I defend the resulting form of downward causation as a solution to the problem of special science autonomy, and discuss two potential accounts of its source, in terms of the debate between kinematic and dynamic theories of the origins of spacetime symmetries. (shrink)

Actualists of a certain stripe—dispositionalists—hold that metaphysical modality is grounded in the powers of actual things. Roughly: p is possible iff something has, or some things have, the power to bring it about that p. Extant critiques of dispositionalism focus on its material adequacy, and question whether there are enough powers to account for all the possibilities we intuitively want to countenance. For instance, it seems possible that none of the actual contingent particulars ever existed, but it is impossible to (...) explain this by appealing to the powers of some actual thing or things to bring it about. I argue instead that dispositionalism, in the simple form championed by its proponents, is formally inadequate. Dispositionalists interpret the modal operators as simple existential claims about powers, but if we interpret the operators that way, the resulting system of modal logic is too weak to capture metaphysical modality. I argue that we can modify the standard dispositionalist interpretations of the operators to secure formal adequacy, but at the cost of accepting that not all modality is grounded in powers. This, I shall suggest, is not a bad thing—the resulting theory still has powers at its core and has certain attractive features, in addition to formal adequacy, that the standard theory lacks. (shrink)

The purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a view regarding the freedom of human action which I call "Causationism," a view which incorporates some of the more fundamental commitments of traditional Determinism while allowing for the possibility of statistically regular actions or components of actions. Premise I of Causationism essentially maintains that all human actions are caused either by statistical regularities or deterministically. The inclusion of statistically regular events or components of actions in a causal account is (...) based on an appeal to the Dretske-Snyder thesis of "Causal Irregularity." Premise II of Causationism is essentially identical to the Incompatibility Thesis of traditional Determinism. My theory then proceeds along traditional Deterministic lines, concluding with the claim that "No one is morally responsible for his or her actions." ;Premise I is defended by appeal to empirical evidence. It is then demonstrated that traditional Libertarian arguments intended to weaken the force of this evidence fail. ;In Chapter III, I consider objections to the Incompatibility Thesis. I argue that a hypothetical reading of "he could have done otherwise" not only fails to capture what we mean when we speak of an individual's "acting freely," but also that a hypothetical reading of this phrase fails to provide a sufficient condition for a morally relevant sense of "freedom." ;In Chapter IV, I argue, by appeal to the concept of "novelty" and to Davidson's Mind/Body Theory, that, contrary to the opinion of some philosophers, an event's being caused does not require that it be predictable or subsumable under statements of probability expectations. ;Chapter V addresses the claim that if all actions are caused, then no action can be rational. A variety of arguments are formulated to demonstrate that various versions of the "Determinist Dilemma" fail. ;Finally, in Chapter VI, I argue that adoption of Causationism does not destroy morality although the denial of moral responsibility significantly alters traditional morality and requires a reanalysis of certain basic ethical terms. I offer the required reanalyses and consider the ramifications of their adoption to ethical theory. (shrink)

Natsume S seki's novel Kokoro (1914) offers an indictment of the loneliness and isolation of a modernized Japan, a Japan in which people ‘feel cut off from every other living thing’. In this essay, I argue that Plato and S seki offer analogous critiques of an eradicated honor culture; an eradication that is rooted in the political exchange of honorific autonomy for honorific heteronomy. Moreover, I suggest that the deprecation and subsequent demise of the Japanese samurai and Greek warrior—individuals for (...) whom self-worth, dignity, and status are rooted in reputation and social regard—exemplify the dramatic cultural shift toward heteronomy. My reading aims to shed light on the rich philosophical connections between seemingly disparate cultures and texts through an exposition and exegesis of the master-protagonists Socrates and Sensei. (shrink)

The creation of a sense of place has emerged as a goal of many community development initiatives. However, little thought has been given to the role of physical spaces in the shaping of possible senses of place. This article examines three Canadian examples of community sustainable development initiatives to demonstrate that sense of place can be shaped and constrained by the geographical and environmental features of the physical space a community occupies. This finding suggests that a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to community (...) sustainable development is unlikely to be successful; a community's sustainable development ethic will be informed by geography. However, there is some evidence that a strong individual sense of place shaped by local space may act as a barrier to the acceptance of new people and ideas. Conversely, a strong sense of place can result in mobilization for sustainable development initiatives. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata on the concept of essence (...) involved. I argue that the traditional modal theory of essence meets these desiderata, but that the resulting theory wrongly implies that certain dispositions essential to mass are essential to charge, thereby offering a new argument against modal theories of essence. I argue that dispositional essentialism requires a primitive notion of essence, and develop a primitivist theory based on Kit Fine's views. I show that the primitivist theory has all the virtues of the modal alternative, and none of the vices. I develop a novel way of thinking about the relationship between properties, laws and dispositions, and argue that it has distinct advantages over standard dispositional essentialist formulations. (shrink)

This study explores the status quo regarding the interface between marketing, social and environmental issues, culture and consumers, and strategic management by integrating sustainability. A qualitative display network technique, based on the bibliometric methodology of co-citation analysis, was applied to examine research clusters. An integrative review was conducted to explain the connections within these clusters. To evaluate potential patterns among the studies through citations, different sets of relationships among applicable sustainability theories in marketing practice were paired in different sets and (...) analyzed. After mapping the scientific structure of journal publications and intellectual linkages, six cluster groups emerged, reflecting the important role of marketing in linking sustainability, society, environment, consumers, and corporate sustainable development. This study contributes to social and marketing research and corporate sustainability practice by categorizing the intellectual structural network within various streams and indicating the influence of social and cultural notions on consumer-focused sustainable marketing. (shrink)

Placing Bruno—both advanced philosopher and magician burned at the stake—in the Hermetic tradition, Yates's acclaimed study gives an overview not only of Renaissance humanism but of its interplay—and conflict—with magic and occult practices. "Among those who have explored the intellectual world of the sixteenth century no one in England can rival Miss Yates. Wherever she looks, she illuminates. Now she has looked on Bruno. This brilliant book takes time to digest, but it is an intellectual adventure to read (...) it. Historians of ideas, of religion, and of science will study it. Some of them, after reading it, will have to think again.... For Miss Yates has put Bruno, for the first time, in his tradition, and has shown what that tradition was."—Hugh Trevor-Roper, _New Statesman_ "A decisive contribution to the understanding of Giordano Bruno, this book will probably remove a great number of misrepresentations that still plague the tormented figure of the Nolan prophet."—Giorgio de Santillana, _American Historical Review_ "Yates's book is an important addition to our knowledge of Giordano Bruno. But it is even more important, I think, as a step toward understanding the unity of the sixteenth century."—J. Bronowski, _New York Review of Books_. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties (...) inherit their causal powers from their realizers. While this principle holds for functional realization, it fails on a broader notion of realization that permits the realization of complex qualitative properties such as spatial and temporal patterns. Such properties are best seen as dependent powerful qualities, which have their causal roles in virtue of being the qualities they are, and do not inherit powers from their realizers. Recent studies have identified one such property—neural synchrony—as a correlate of consciousness. If synchrony is also partially constitutive of consciousness, then phenomenal properties are both multiply realizable and causally novel. I outline a version of representationalism about consciousness on which this constitution claim holds. (shrink)

According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition <p> is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and <p> is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as <2+2=4>, nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come out (...) both necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T), it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that <p> is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for <2+2=4>, without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for <2+2=4>. (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether a powers ontology facilitates a reduction of causal relations to intrinsic powers of the causal relata. I first argue that there is a tension in the view that powerful causation is an internal relation in this sense. Powers are ontologically dependent on other powers for their individuation, but in that case—given an Aristotelian conception of properties as immanent universals—powers will not be intrinsic on several extant analyses of ‘intrinsic’, since to possess a given power (...) P requires the existence of other concrete particulars as bearers of the powers that individuate P. I suggest several ways for Aristotelians to resolve this tension, but all tenable options involve individuative type-level causal relations between powers. While these individuative relations between powers are internal in the sense that the powers are essentially related, this is a different sense of ‘ internal ’ to the one that entails reducibility. The proposed reduction of token-causal relations to powers succeeds only at the cost of irreducible type-level causal relations between the powers themselves. (shrink)

An introduction to our edited volume, The Metaphysics of Relations, covering a range of issues including the problem of order, the ontological status of relations, reasons for ancient scepticism about relational properties, and two ways of drawing the distinction between internal and external relations.

Western music is characterized primarily by simple meters, but a number of other musical cultures, including Turkish, have both simple and complex meters. In Experiment 1, Turkish and American adults with and without musical training were asked to detect metrical changes in Turkish music with simple and complex meter. Musicians performed significantly better than nonmusicians, and performance was significantly better on simple meter than on complex meter, but Turkish listeners performed no differently than American listeners. In Experiment 2, members of (...) Turkish classical and folk music clubs who were tested on the same materials exhibited comparable sensitivity to simple and complex meters, unlike the American and Turkish listeners in Experiment 1. Together, the findings reveal important effects of musical training and culture on meter perception: trained musicians are generally more sensitive than nonmusicians, regardless of metrical complexity, but sensitivity to complex meter requires sufficient exposure to musical genres featuring such meters. (shrink)

Americans have trillions of dollars invested in public and private companies, yet stock ownership is highly unequal: the wealthiest 1 percent of households possess 40 percent of all wealth, and there is a large and persistent racial wealth gap. What if innovations in distributed technologies allowed for democratic facilitation of new opportunities for wealth and a rebalancing of power within the capital markets? This article proposes using innovative financial technologies to create a “Public Investment Platform”—a public option for participation in (...) capital markets—and a “Public Investment Account” to universalize access to investment opportunities. Capital markets are currently governed by public policies that submerge the role of the public in structuring them and enable an inequitable accumulation of wealth. To democratize finance, new policies are required to democratize participation in investment. (shrink)

Modern scholarship on decision behavior dates from the late 1940s. But that scholarship has been preoccupied with two ideas that are much older. One is the notion of expected utility, first articulated in the scholarly literature by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. In its simplest form, the expected utility concept applies to monetary gambles. Imagine you are asked to choose between two gifts, either gamble G, which you would then play and get either $9 or nothing, or else a simple, direct (...) payment of $3. As shown in the decision tree in figure 10.1, you receive gamble G's $9 payoff if the toss of a fair die yields one or two pips, but you receive nothing otherwise. (In decision trees, choice points are represented by square nodes, chance points by circular nodes.) The expected value or expectation of a gamble is the sum of its payoffs, each weighted (i.e., multiplied) by its probability. Thus, the expected value of G is EV(G) = (1/3)($9) + (2/3)($0) = $3, the same as the direct payment. So, if you generally make decisions like this one so as to maximize expected value, you would be indifferent between the present options. However, if you are like most people, you are not indifferent. Instead, you are risk‐averse, preferring the guaranteed $3. Why? (shrink)

First impressions -- Sheep -- Counting sheep in the belly of the wolf -- What was pastoral (again)? more versions (otium for sheep) -- Oranges -- Invisible Inc. (time for oranges) -- Gold you can eat (on theft) -- Yeast -- Bread and stones (on bubbles) -- Erasures.

Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to (...) bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized properties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal-functional accounts of realization and embrace a broader account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O—a qualitative, multiply realizable property—plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery. (shrink)

This note criticizes the political consequences Feyerabend draws from his ?epistemological anarchism?. Democratic relativism holds that since no traditions are ?true?, all must be given equal status in a free society. A basic protective structure is required, though, to keep the various institutions from overwhelming one another. I argue that Feyerabend provides no assurance that the protective structure would not be taken over by particular institutions; parallel problems exist for education. Hence Feyerabend's proposal is unworkable in principle. Furthermore it is (...) undesirable since members of traditions would not wish to have their beliefs regarded as ?one set among many?. The pluralism Feyerabend wants already exists naturally in nontotalitarian societies; hence the institutionalization of pluralism is unnecessary and would do more harm than good. (shrink)

This article explores the ways in which Janelle Monáe’s audiovisual performances leverage black female flesh to trouble historically constituted imaginings of ‘the human’. Tracking Monáe’s audiovisual aesthetics across ‘Many moons’ and Dirty Computer, I interrogate acoustic and imagistic resonances that recall the repeating horrors of bondage, and which also constitute performative ‘fabulations’ whereby freedoms that are engendered specifically by and within black female flesh might be imagined. Monáe ‘enfleshes’ the cyborg to critique cyberfeminist and posthumanist theories that advocate for material (...) dissolution as a framework for liberation, as well as to trouble black women’s historical relationships to the category ‘human’. Rather than understand Dirty Computer as a (re)turn to the human Monáe, I contend that the project extends the artist’s longstanding critical engagement with the black female cyborg and black sonic cyberfeminist liberatory potentialities. (shrink)

In Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege tried to show that arithmetic is logical by giving gap-free proofs from what he took to be purely logical basic laws. But how do we come to judge these laws as true, and to recognize them as logical? The answer must involve giving an account of the apparent arguments Frege provides for his axioms. Following Sanford Shieh, I take these apparent arguments to instead be exhibitions: the exercise of a logical capacity in order to bring (...) us into a state of judgement. I provide an account of what sort of inferential capacities are at play in such exhibitions, and explain how they lead us to judge that Frege’s primitive laws are general and undeniable. I will also situate my account with respect to other rival interpretations, particularly the elucidatory interpretations of Joan Weiner and Thomas Ricketts. (shrink)

The 'completeness of physics' is the key premise in the causal argument for physicalism. Standard formulations of it fail to rule out emergent downwards causation. I argue that it must do this if it is tare in a valid causal argument for physicalism. Drawing on the notion of conferring causal power, I formulate a suitable principle, 'strong completeness'. I investigate the metaphysical implications of distinguishing this principle from emergent downwards causation, and I argue that categoricalist accounts of properties are better (...) equipped to sustain the distinction than dispositional essentialist accounts. Finally, I argue that the additional evidence needed for strong completeness renders the causal argument otiose for any properties amenable to scientific reduction. (shrink)

¿Puede Tomás de Aquino, pensador del siglo XIII, decirnos algo a nuestra realidad política latinoamericana actual? Un texto entre dos contextos es el pretexto para generar una reflexión en torno al derecho a la rebelión, desde la perspectiva de la no-violencia y el derecho a la desobediencia civil. Un camino desde la justicia y el buen gobierno en el Aquinate, seguido del bien común político y las virtudes políticas en el Angélico para desembocar en el derecho a la rebelión, es (...) la ruta que se traza para esta exposición. Una lectura desde la propuesta exegética hermenéutica del Dr. René Padilla, es decir, una comprensión intuitiva, una comprensión gramático-histórica y una comprensión contextualizadora son el cómo y modo del presente trabajo. (shrink)

Through the lens of feminist theory, Kuo examines the milieu of prostitutes and the role of prostitution in contemporary society, and how the interplay of those two works itself out in practice.